Grounded at the word go
Grounded at the word go
In the next few weeks, Bangalore will see the unveiling of a new international airport. Billed as India’s first greenfield public-private partnership (PPP) airport, this is a project that has gone through all the challenges an innovator faces. Construction began on 2 July 2005, marking the end of a tortuous process that began in 2001, with the final concession agreement being signed in 2004. During this period, the project was buffeted by the political currents of changing governments at the Centre and in the state. Governments everywhere learnt a lot about the challenges of doing airport privatization from the Bangalore experience.
Unfortunately, there is no happy ending. With the airport set to open in March, there are no smiling faces in Bangalore. There are two fundamental issues with the airport: the first—and more serious long-term problem—has to do with capacity constraints.
In analysing airport capacity, one can get lost in the gobbledegook of technical data about runways, ramps, airspace rights and peak hour movements. The bottom line, however, is easy to see. Soon after signing its contract, Bangalore International Airport Ltd (Bial) commissioned Lufthansa Consulting (LHC) in 2005 to undertake a revised traffic study, given Bangalore’s explosive air traffic growth. LHC’s most optimistic estimates projected 10.1 million passengers by 2010. The reality: Bangalore has already clocked more than 10 million passengers this year.
More realistically, Bial estimated that passenger traffic in Bangalore would reach 11.3 million in 2015, seven years from now. We will cross this mark before this calendar year is out, seven years ahead of expectations.
What does this mean? Adding airport capacity isn’t like building bus bays in a local bus depot. At full stretch, a single runway cannot do more than 10 million passengers, beyond which a second runway will be required. This means lead time to build, as well as a host of related technical issues. Given that we have already reached 10 million passengers, Bial’s only runway will be running at full capacity the day it opens. Even if work on a second runway begins right away, it cannot get operational for another three years—during which time another 10 million passengers can be added to Bangalore’s demand, with no airport or runway to service them. The Bial contract requires that no other airport be operational for a 150km radius—meaning that the current Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) airport will shut down.
This is new territory for Indian governments, as we witness the underestimation of a runaway economy. Just last week, a Mint story reported on the recently opened Delhi-Gurgaon expressway: “The original traffic flow projections, carried out in 1998, were way off the mark: The flows projected for 2013 were witnessed the day the expressway was opened. Against the estimate of 80,000 vehicles a day, the actual flow is around 140,000.”
Little can be done about the Delhi-Gurgaon situation. But in Bangalore, we are going to do something extraordinarily stupid. Even as we struggle to build much-needed infrastructure in the country, Bangalore will actually witness the first instance of shutting down existing infrastructure. The argument here isn’t against private operators: Bial needs to make the returns that it projected when it won the tender. But given the growth in traffic volume, there’s no question that they will make out even better than this, even if HAL airport were kept open.
As if this is not enough, we have the second problem of connectivity to the new airport, because of a state government that has been asleep at the wheel. It’s astonishing that we are talking about something as trivial as road connectivity at the 11th hour, four years after the concession agreement was signed, and eight years after the decision to locate the international airport at Devanahalli.
A plea to Manmohan Singh and Praful Patel. When you come to Bangalore on 30 March to “inaugurate” the airport, don’t parachute in like VIPs. Instead, travel like the average passenger, toiling from Rajajinagar through West of Chord Road, battling the trucks across Peenya, getting stuck at the Yeshwantapur railway crossing, stop-starting across the 26km highway stretch sliced by 23 junctions with tractors and bicyclists and pedestrians, before bouncing over a 4km dust-track to finally get to the spanking new airport. Wouldn’t it more fitting if the inauguration were on 1 April?
So, a few weeks in advance, here’s a greeting to Bangalore’s air travellers: Welcome to the most underdesigned, underconnected, woeful piece of infrastructure that is the face of new India to the world. Maybe we can harness a new source of renewable energy in India: “angry citizen energy”. It’s available in plenty, and being replenished every day by our governments.
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The author is Co-Founder of Janaagraha.
Re: Grounded at the word go
Ramesh,
Appreciate your strong criticism, but it seems very negative overall. (except for road connectivity issue which you are 100% right)
Firstly, you state a 10 million handled by HAL currently, I've read reports of 7.5 million only. So, how reliable are the numbers?
Secondly, your forecast of 10 more million in 3 years is an exaggeration because BIAL itself predicts only 18.3 million (total) in 2025!
Also, i think you've indirectly stated about keeping HAL airport open as well. We all know it was built to test IAF aircrafts. Plus, all of us (including you & me) have made a mockery of current HAL airport for "crumbling infrastructure". So, not sure why this is being raised.
Bottomline, now that we wanted a brand new airport...we've started to complain already!!!
Re: Grounded at the word go
Good article. A little late in the day but still. I wrote about this in EPW Oct 2006. There is a similar problem here in Goa. Also in Hyderabad as may know.
Re: Grounded at the word go
I am commenting without the benefit of a review of the responses with which the article has supposedly been "inundated". My first reaction is "There but for the grace of God goes Goa".
This is because Goa's civil enclave (Dabolim) too was served a "death sentence" back in 2000 when a new airport got built at Mopa. There was no airport builder/operator in sight then (nor is now) but a French airport consultant designed an A380 category airport for 10 million passengers (minimum scale) with all the bells and whistles estimated at Rs 1000 crores in 2005. Mopa is at the northern most tip of Goa (whereas Dabolim is central) and surface transport links would have to be laid afresh just as for BIAL.
Local political opposition stalled progress and the consultant did a rethink. Now the state government has proposed that Goa should have two airports i.e. Dabolim should not be closed. The ball is in the civil aviation ministry's court.
What should be done about Mopa now? Should a (smaller) Taj Mahal be built (now estimated to cost Rs 1350 crores due to inflation in construction costs!) or should it grow progressively in tandem with Dabolim? The former might kill Dabolim in the natural course. The latter (think "slow cycling") might be too much of a strain on Goa's planning and execution capablities and we would remain at the mercy of the military at Dabolim.
It seems to me that the crux of the matter lies in thinking of two airports as a system. This requires inculcating a spirit of collaboration between the two airports for the long haul, not cut-throat competition in the short run. The latter is between systems e.g. Bangalore vs Hyderabad. It requires transparency from the word "Go", careful design to maintain a balance of power in the medium term, cross over at some future point in time etc.
Was this "the road not taken" at Bangalore and Hyderabad? These two may be history but lessons can/must be applied to Goa. Down the line we have Pune and Agra and who knows how many other thriving civil enclaves. Its time for a paradigm shift in airport planning.